The Signified World The Problem of Occasionality in Husserl's Phenomenology of Meaning

This study offers the first comprehensive account of the problem of situation-dependence and facticity in Husserl's phenomenology of meaning. On the basis of a reconsideration of the ideas of Husserl's phenomenological approach to meaning and intentionality, it presents a reconstruction and assessment of Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning. Taking its lead from Husserl's self-critical remark on the analysis of "occasional expressions" in the Logical Investigations, the study uncovers the underlying problem with Husserl's initial conception of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity. It is shown that the problem of occasionality does not relate to indexicality in a standard sense, but to the essential facticity and subject-relativity of the intentional individuation of real being in general and to the contingency and inexhaustible transcendence of the world. The reconstruction of Husserl's solution is carefully related to an interpretation of central ideas of Husserl's developed philosophy. Critically reviewing influential interpretations of Husserl, the study elaborates on the question of internalism and externalism, the question of representationalism, the question of ideal contents, the notion of noema and the issues of direct reference and de re meaning. It is shown how Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning is related to the analysis of horizon-intentionality, to the constitution of the transcendent real world and to the constitution of the lived body as a centre of situated orientation. It is argued that Husserl succeeds in maintaining phenomenological internalism with regard to intentionality in concreto, while accepting a form of externalism with regard to meaning, according to which the possibility of true identity of meaning is bound to the presumptive existence of the experienced world.